Handbook of Moral Motivation

Theories, Models, Applications

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IV. FROM ETHICAL HOSTILITY TOWARD COOPERATIVE ETHICS

INTRODUCTION

"The time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of philosophers and biologicized" (Wilson, 1975, p. 562), E. O. Wilsons, the father of Sociobiology demanded almost 40 years ago. Meanwhile biologists and economists have gained much more knowledge about moral motivations than philosophers. Yet, still philosophers have the jurisdiction in defining ethics and morality. Nevertheless, if we want to understand moral motivation, standard ethics only assures us that it is the good which motivates us to follow the good.

STANDARD ETHICS

Standard ethics is based on the idea that there is something like a mental condition that makes us do something that is really good. This mental condition is imagined to be the motivation of ethical action. It shall not be caused by activity in our biology or in the emotion itself, but by pure reasoning about what is bad and what is good. An act is said to be moral, according to this deontological opinion, when it is not based on usefulness or utilitarian values. Moral actions are supposed to be based on categorical values, which are said to be totally different from utilitarian aims or the emotions of an individual, as Michael Sandel assumes (Sandel, 2009).

Is it really true that our moral sentiments are based on something that can be called good in an absolute sense? Deontologists take it for granted without proof that moral judgments are not to be compared with all the expressions of useful interests (Tanner, Medin & Iliev, 2008). Kant postulated – without proof – the "factum of reason" which established the categorical difference between usefulness and reasonableness. Wittgenstein, for example, suspects that every moral judgment referring to categorical or absolute good is based on misuse of language. He only accepts ethical rules expressed in a relative sense of the good – good for something else, not good for its own sake.

Without mentioning the utilitarian position, Ludwig Wittgenstein rejected any deontological point of view in ethics and morality. The idea of the "absolute good" he defined as a "state of affairs" that "would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about". Wittgenstein logically concluded "that such a state of affairs is a

chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge. Then what have all of us who, like me, are still tempted to use such expressions as 'absolute good', 'absolute value', etc., in mind and what do we try to express?" (Wittgenstein, 1929, para. 2). If there is only "good" in a relative sense, categorical values are excluded.

Misuse of language, in a more common way, means that we present a prescriptive intention as if it were a simple description of a situation. "To help Mary moving her piano is good" looks similar to the description: "To drive the car safely is good". However, only the second expression is a description of what objectively we must do in order not to cause harm. This misuse is a well-established maneuver to persuade others to accept my own preferences for Mary or helping women in general, because I treat the word "good" in a way as if it were a common duty, given by the laws of nature. In the prescriptive sense the motivation of helping Mary is imagined to be based on the moral meaning of "good" and not on the usefulness of the action.

More precisely than Wittgenstein's logical analysis of language, neurobiology has now brought up clear evidence that no action can be done without an expected reward. This scientific fact we have to consider in a strong sense. As long as we did not have empirical knowledge of the causal function of the mesolimbic award system, there was some evidence that moral activity like altruism could be not based on reward or benefit. Explaining ethics nowadays must notice that no human action can be fulfilled without the expectation of reward in the same way as a patient with Parkinson's disease cannot move his legs without the production of Dopamine in his substantia nigra (Schultz, 2009). We refer to this biological fact while using the word "reward" even in ethical contexts.

The reward can be the happiness of being good according to the sacred values an individual has established. It can be achieved by dropping names or avoiding names. In speaking politically correctly, for example, we produce euphemisms which are created to soften the blow of something taboo. Euphemisms quickly absorb any negative connotations; however, the reward can also be utilitarian reasoning. The expectation of reward in one of these senses is a necessary cause for moral action. There are no effects without causes and there will be no human action without activation of the reward system in the brain (Narvaez, 2008). That means that the mental condition of an idea like the absolute good of the categorical good itself will never be able to replace the motivation of any action.

It follows that every supposed "absolute value" is actually bound by conditions. Even sacred values such as deontological or religious goods can only be recognized as being good if the areas of the brain known to be associated with reward were activated. If there were anything like categorical values, as Kant and deontologists assert, they would not be bound by conditions like all the other values that are associated with activity in the reward-related regions of the brain. Categorical values are imagined to generate a duty to do what we ought to do only according to the rational system of thinking about the good – without any inclination of our emotions

or individual interest. In fact there is reason to distinguish between deontological and utilitarian judgments (Berns, 2012), but these activities, located in different areas of the brain, must both create the expectation of reward. Therefore, every categorical value is actually a hypothetical value. Deontology with its sacred values does not differ much from utilitarianism as long as both describe aims of human actions that are done only if they activate the reward-related regions of the brain. If there is no reward expected but only punishment, or our sacred values are contradicted by their opposites, researchers find there is arousal in the amygdala, which is associated with negative emotions (Ibid).

In general, our moral and ethical standards are useful social rules that are simply read off and acted on when a relevant case arises. We have to evaluate the consequences and the harms and benefits that our actions impose on others. As long as we do not expect any other causes for moral action than the expectation of benefit within our social order, every ethical system and its moral judgments admits empirical investigation. The rejection of empirical ethics and the investigation of empirical causes in morality, however, have led deontology to the negligence of important biological and emotional motivations for morality. Deontology is the tradition of Kant's moral philosophy. It is justified by J. Habermas, J. Nida-Rümelin, M. Sandel e.a. They have in common the non-theologically idea if an absolute good or justice which is in no way reduced to economy, biology and strategic thinking. "Reasonably one does what has the best consequences", Nida-Rümelin writes. "This apparently trivial thesis is wrong. Why it is wrong will be illustrated in this chapter."[1] More explicitly, Habermas attempts "to defend the priority of the deontologically understood justice…"[2]

One of the most neglected motivations for moral judgment and action is fear and rejected hostility. Even if philosophical ethics has had little interest in this subject, ordinary life, fiction and poetry nonetheless tell us about it. I shall present some examples from ordinary life and literature to support the thesis that a large proportion of moral judgments produce the sensation of being good even if the individual pursues hostile aims. I shall try to explain the observation that moral judgments can produce a reward while diminishing the awareness of hostility and fear in an individual.

First of all, I shall consider the question of how it can be that the miraculous word "justice" is able to hide such a wicked trait as desire for revenge. Poets, writers and other artists are perfectly well acquainted with the magic of moral talk using this word. Nonetheless, scientists in the wide field of human sciences do not refer to the hostile implications of moral judgments that can be concealed by using the word "justice". Only few philosophers in the tradition of materialistic thinking emphasize this non-ethical origin of justice: "It is not accidental that justice occupied a key position for those philosophers who, although they are counted among the greatest of antiquity, have written not about natural law but of patriarchal, lordly law." The eye of law – this is Ernst Blochs conviction – "sits in the face of the ruling class" (Bloch, 1987, pp. 39 and 181).

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ETHICAL HOSTILITY

On a beautiful afternoon in a small town in the middle of Europe, people are preparing for the arrival of a famous native of the town who left it 30 years ago. Since then, she has become a billionaire and now promises to provide the town with much-needed funds, to raise it from its state of disrepair. Residents are suffering considerable hardship and poverty. The twentieth-century Swiss writer Friedrich Dürrenmatt, dreamed up this town, gave it the name Guellen (which literally means "manure" and "to manure") and placed it in Switzerland. It could be anywhere in the civilized world.

The billionaire is the 63-year-old Claire Zachanassian, with red hair, an artificial leg and an artificial hand. She announces to the impoverished townspeople that she will donate one billion dollars, depending on one condition: she will only give it in return for the death of her former lover, Alfred Ill, the owner of Guellen's general store and the most popular man in town. As she became pregnant, Alfred Ill denied their love and together with former citizens organized her expulsion. Now, her donation is conditional on Ill's death.

Claire tells the residents that she wants *justice*. She only came with the intention of buying herself *justice* but everybody knows that she wants revenge. Yet the word "revenge" is not even mentioned in the whole play. Claire only talks about justice.

One could say this is fiction and has nothing to do with ordinary life. One would be wrong, as the following example shows. We quote this example because it shows clearly the concealed hostility in a moral action and in the feeling of being good. In the year 2007 the Pope reinstituted the Latin-language "Prayer for conversion of the Jews". Catholics are urged to pray for the Jews, to pray that the "Lord our God" may "illuminate their hearts so that they may recognize Jesus Christ as savior of all men." It is not important for us to discuss the pontiff's action in relation to the Good Friday Mass after the Second Ecumenical Council of the Vatican, which ended in 1965; and it does not diminish the meaning of ethical hostility that the prayer is only performed in the Easter Week and only in the Latin-language liturgy. It is important however to recognize that the prayer can have an outrageous, malicious meaning even when the conscious perception of a praying individual's intention does not show any hostility.

What are hostile implications of moral judgments? In our examples, one fictional and the other non-fictional, ethical hostility can be discovered as one side of the ambivalence of feelings. An individual's consciousness can have the dominant awareness that his praying for the Jews is a philanthropic gesture, even as he actually transmits hostility to the Jews. This is the moral implication of the ambivalence and it has priority in consciousness. In fact prior to that philanthropic feeling is the hostile intention. Human beings however usually do not like seeing themselves as hostile. Every row begins as fighting back. Aggressors never recognize themselves as the initiators of a row or a fight. There is only the perception of defending and doing something necessary or even doing their duty. Especially hostility in an anti-Semitic

sense must be kept in repression.³ The most efficient way of avoiding any recollection of one's own hostility is to overemphasize philanthropy and humanity.

Catholics, in the mentioned prayer, propose that the Jews are damned. To a pious and devout Catholic believer, this means that a Jew cannot belong to the chosen few who will be redeemed on the Day of Judgment. It makes the believer feel pity for the Jew. He wants to embrace the damned fellow and soothe his suffering. While feeling pity and sorrow, the believer enjoys the idea of being altruistic in a deep sense for humanity, which makes him forget the slightest sensation of hostility. The whole action depends however on the believer's conviction that being a Jew means something evil. The emphasis on the philanthropic implication of the action of praying arises from the fear of his own hostility in the character of the praying individual. Actually this action is one of harsh discrimination but the individual will never be aware of his prior motivation. So that is why the Vatican claims that no disrespect was intended. This might be right, because the conscious self and its intention have no idea of the discriminating hostility in the prayer.

Only the target of the altruistic gesture recognizes the hostility. One rabbi said the Good Friday prayer strikes Jews as "exclusivist and triumphalist."⁴ So far the prayer has not been repealed.

A REMARKABLE OBSERVATION

In moral judgments we can discover a considerable amount of fear - especially the fear of one's own hostility and one's own pleasure. Fear of the concealed memory of one's own cruelty can be the concealed part of the ambivalence of feelings. One of the earliest sources of the awareness that moral emotions depend on the memory of cruelty in oneself or the group to which one belongs can be found in Georg Forster's *A Voyage round the World*. Georg Forster (1754-1794) spent almost four years of his youth on the ship *Resolution* during James Cook's second voyage around the world. In New Zealand, a group of lieutenants and sailors explored an island and just happened to witness an act of cannibalism. A dead young man in the sand close to the ocean attracted their attention. Obviously the man was a victim of cannibalism after hostility between two tribes. Except for the missing chin the head was almost undamaged, and one of the lieutenants took it as a souvenir onto the *Resolution*. Inhabitants approached in their canoes and even some sailors on the *Resolution* seemed to be very interested in the head when one of the Englishmen offered them a roasted piece of the cheek. "The rest lamented this action as a brutal depravation of human nature", writes Forster,

"agreeable to the principles which they had imbibed. However, the sensibility of Mahine, the young native of the Society Islands, shone out with superior lustre among us. Born and bred in a country where the inhabitants have already emerged from the darkness of barbarism, and are united by the bonds of society, this scene filled his mind with horror. He turned his eyes from the unnatural

object, and retired into the cabin, to give vent to the emotions of his heart. There we found him bathed in tears; his looks were a mixture of compassion and grief, and as soon as he saw us, he expressed his concern for the unhappy parents of the victim. This turn which his reflections had taken, gave us infinite pleasure; it spoke a human heart, filled with the warmest sentiments of social affection, an habituated to sympathize with its fellow-creatures. He was so deeply affected, that it was several hours before he could compose himself, and ever after, when he spoke on this subject, it was not without emotion" (Forster, 2000, p. 279).

Mahine, the young passenger from the Society Islands, who was "born and bred in a country where the inhabitants have already emerged from the darkness of barbarism", showed the strongest emotional reaction, as Forster emphasizes. We could read: "... where the inhabitants have *just* emerged from the darkness of barbarism...", because of his proximity to the former cannibalism in his own society. The memory of cannibalism that his society has overcome must be kept under repression. He is not able to express the cruelty of cannibalism itself; he only expresses "his concern for the unhappy parents of the victim". To be concerned about the unhappy parents however is obviously something other than being concerned about "the unnatural object".

Forster's statement can be read as an example of Sigmund Freud's theory of emotional ambivalence, explicated in *Totem and Taboo*, where he compares taboo ceremonials to modern neurosis, to which religion still has to be attributed, in Freud's opinion. Excessive apprehensiveness and solicitude

"is very common in neuroses, and especially in obsessional neuroses, with which our comparison is chiefly drawn. We have come to understand its origin quite clearly. It appears wherever, in addition to a predominant feeling of affection, there is also a contrary, but unconscious current of hostility — a state of affairs which represents a typical instance of an ambivalent emotional attitude.

The hostility is then shouted down, as it were, by an excessive intensification of the affection, which is expressed as solicitude and becomes compulsive, because it might otherwise be inadequate to perform its task of keeping the unconscious contrary current of feeling under repression. Every psychoanalyst knows from experience with what certainty this explanation of solicitous over-affection is found to apply even in the most unlikely circumstances — in cases, for instance, of attachments between a mother and child or between a devoted married couple. If we now apply this to the case of privileged persons, we shall realize that alongside of the veneration, and indeed idolization, felt towards them, there is in the unconscious an opposing current of intense hostility that, in fact, as we expected, we are faced by a situation of emotional ambivalence." (Freud, 1961, p. 46)

We can compare moral actions like the one described to neuroses. The latter make people feel strong emotions – namely fear and angst – if they are restrained from doing things that are futile. "Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood / Clean from my hand? No, this my hand will rather / The multitudinous seas incarnadine, / Making the green one red" (Act 2, scene 2), Lady Macbeth cried out as she did her bloody work. As we all know, the habit of repeatedly washing one's own hands expresses a feeling of guilt. If someone is restrained from obsessively washing his hands, he will be attacked by panic. With the appearance of being interested only in the proper and the pure (state of his hands), the neurotic person has shouted down his remembrance of the contrary: the unconscious current of impurity and hostility.

Freud referred to James George Frazer's *The Golden Bough* and his studies of some particularities in king taboos: "Indeed", Freud writes,

"owing to the variety of outcomes of a conflict of this kind which are reached among different peoples, we are not at a loss for examples in which the existence of this hostility is still more obviously shown. 'The savage Timmes of Sierra Leone', we learn from Frazer, 'who elect their king, reserve to themselves the right of beating him on the eve of his coronation; and they avail themselves of this constitutional privilege with such hearty goodwill that sometimes the unhappy monarch does not long survive his elevation to the throne. Hence when the leading chiefs have spite towards a man and wish to rid themselves of him, they elect him king.'

Even in glaring instances like this, however, the hostility is not admitted as such, but masquerades as a ceremonial" (Freud, 1961, p. 46).

Even if no fear in an explicit sense can be observed, we count it as a kind of moral fear if people conceal their hostile intentions behind the mask of great humanity. Famous dramas and thrillers use this element of ethical hostility to highlight the sinister character of a criminal. Alfred Hitchcock's movies – for instance *Saboteur* from the year 1942 – give shape to the evil by drawing his figures with an excessive solicitude and over-emphasis on their humanity. One member of the gang, who is planning to blow up a huge dam and a power plant, mentions in a conversation while passing the plant in a car: "I'm glad we came this way, even if it adds some miles to our trip. But somehow I become a little bit sentimental. I want to take a last look at it. Beautiful isn't it? A great monument to men's unceasing industry." About the chief of the gang, whose crimes include responsibility for the death of hundreds of workers in an aircraft factory they have just burnt down, he declares in the same conversation: "You know Tobin very well?" – "No, not very well. I just met him once on his ranch." – "Did he have a child with him?" – "His grandchild? Yes. He seemed to be very vulnerable." – "Yes, that's one of the things that I like about Tobin, his love for that little girl. Evidence of a good heart."

The audience understands this very well and appreciates this tension between the conscious state of mind – "evidence of a good heart" - and the uncontrollable power

of hostility, which is shouted down with that caressing affection. The conscious self obviously does not allow the awareness of both pleasure and hostility in our character. It provokes opportunities to "prove" the humanity of an individual.

FEAR AND MORALITY

Fear can be a special kind of motivation. It motivates people to do something that is only concentrated on diminishing the fear and not on the diminishing of danger. So far, we have neglected the distinction between angst and fear or fright but this distinction can help us to become aware of real dangers. What we have to be aware of, for our own safety, are real dangers. We must learn to fear dangers that really exist, but we should diminish our fear of things that are not dangerous at all. The German noun "angst" describes the emotion of someone who believes that harmless situations, things, words or thoughts could be dangerous. We have to remember how dominant fear in the sense of angst in taboos occurs, mostly in cases of politically correct speaking. We feel the strong emotion not to speak out the tabooed words but if we did name the taboo-word it would not cause any real danger.

The problem with this emotion is that it makes individuals do things that do not necessarily diminish real dangers but only hide this unreasonable fear or angst. For example, people often fear the number "13". This involves them in wasting lots of time and other resources to escape the number "13"; yet none of these activities avoids any real dangers because the number "13" isn't dangerous at all. The same is true of fear of the dead, fear of foreigners, fear of love or the fear of not being loved by God, fear of gays, fears about liberals and so on. Things like these are better described by the word angst. Angst is only concerned with making itself vanish. All these fears – or Ängste – can only create new dangers, instead of diminishing the original one. To handle a real danger, we must not hide a bad feeling but face it and find its causes in order to diminish them.

Gays are not dangerous in themselves but it is obvious that the moral condemnation of gays is caused by the fear of one's own interest in homosexuality, which has to be repressed.

If we start to ask why an increasing number of things occur that trigger angst, we find one reason in the alliance between fear – in the meaning of angst – and ethics or morality. Barry Glassner, who has investigated American society, states: "Our fear grows, I suggest, proportionate to our unacknowledged guilt" (Glassner, 1999, p. 72). Glassner's suggestion repeats Sigmund Freud's thesis that permanently repressed pleasure will become angst. Nonetheless, civilization always requires repression of pleasure. In some cases, that means repression of aggression. This can be easily achieved through an everyday phenomenon. We all know that above all communities with adjoining territories and other mutual interests and relations are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each other. Freud recalls by name the Spaniards and the Portuguese, but we can add every local patriotic aggression which can arise between two towns or cities that are separated by a river or a valley.

It also happens whenever a nation strengthens the cohesion of its own people by provoking difficulties in foreign affairs. What Freud earlier named "the narcissism of minor differences" explains the hostile implications in the experience of being good or belonging to the good. "We can now see that it is a convenient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression by means of which cohesion between the members of the community is made easier. ... When once the Apostle Paul had posited universal love between men and the foundation of his Christian community, extreme intolerance on the part of Christendom towards those who remained outside it became that inevitable consequence" (Freud, 1962, p. 61).

The angst behind our moral values appears in another commonly known phenomenon. Imagine you have a large amount of money that a friend gave to you, to save it for him. No one knows about this deal. Imagine now that you find yourself in financial difficulties. You think of the money and how urgently you need it. Your decision to take from your friend's money only depends on the strength of your moral values. This means it depends on the power of the demand: "Thou shalt not steal". If this demand fails to rule your action, then you know that you can no longer promise to stay clear of becoming corrupt but you fear your own hostile tendencies if you hold on to the high ethical demands. You know that you can no longer guarantee not to become a corrupt person if your moral standards fail. This strong uncertainty, where you no longer know how you will cope with a conflict over whether your "free will" to be fair and responsible can overcome your hostility and egoism, produces angst about your own weakness.

This is the meaning of the quotation people refer to when they say: "If God does not exist, everything is allowed" (Dostoyevsky, F., *The Brothers Karamazov*). Obviously this thesis is wrong. I am not allowed to steal, to kill, not even to smoke in restaurants if god does not exist. Even if it is not against the law, people will not allow each other to lie, to be unfair or even to be mean but I myself could fear ceasing to be moral if the strong claim has disappeared. I fear that I would allow myself too much, because I don't trust myself. It is a fear - in the sense of angst - of my own hostility, which I know could be stronger than my own free will not to be hostile. I fear the loss of a helpful motivation. "Do you wish my life to have no meaning?" (Camus, 1942, p. 46), Albert Camus lets the investigator ask the stranger who is accused of murder. The stranger has just explained to the investigator that he does not think his belief in god has anything to do with the trial. The investigator fears the idea that his utmost moral principle — god — could be less important than he believes. For in that case the investigator could no longer guarantee to be good. His life could be without meaning, because he fears that he is unable to give meaning to his own life. He fears the loss of his own humanity if God no longer tells him how to be human.

Erich Fromm has investigated this subject and named it the fear of freedom in one of his early works:

"...authority can appear as internal authority, under the name of duty, conscience, or super-ego. As a matter of fact, the development of modern thinking from

Protestantism to Kant's philosophy, can be characterized as the substitution of internalized authority for an external one" (Fromm, 2001, p. 143).

INSTRUMENT OF POWER

As long as ethics and morality give those who are at a disadvantage additional chances they must conceal their gain of power. Moral behaviour in the sense of marked simplicity can generate the feeling of being more powerful than those who are privileged. Many anecdotes about the cynic Diogenes generate humor time and again by making use of the same mechanism. Here are some examples:

One day while he was wasting time in his barrel, Diogenes was visited by Alexander the Great. As Alexander asked him where he came from, Diogenes answered: "cosmopolites" – that means: "I am a citizen of the whole world."

How small must Alexander the Great have felt. He, who had conquered India and Persia, subjugated Greece and owned almost everything in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, thought only that he was a citizen of Greece. And how grandiose must Diogenes have felt, who did not own anything, who held no position and lived in a barrel? It is said that once, while Diogenes was sunning himself, Alexander the Great came up to him and offered to grant him any request. Diogenes told him: "Stand away from the sun on me."

How small again must Alexander have felt, after hearing that Diogenes requested nothing more from him but what anybody else could grant, namely to get out of the way.

The mechanism of this humour is obvious. First there is a hostile implication, which is then masked by the predominant tone of affection in his words. Most of all, there is a remarkable gain of power for Diogenes when he answers in the way he does. It seems that people who appreciate Diogenes' answers especially like – and fear at the same time – this very cheaply gained amount of power. As game theorists have recently discovered, limiting one's own options brings a special kind of social power. Fasting and hunger strikes are methods of protesting injustice and pressuring opponents. This kind of pressure is carried out in a way that forces opponents to back down by limiting one's own freedom of behaviour into one single option. The fasting or hunger-striking person shows that he will maintain his strategy until the very end. The nonviolent strategy actually is based on self-interest and shows a manipulative element of suffering, for the others' compassion is used against their interest (Biggs, 2003).

Even Charity can be regarded as an instrument of power. Ethics and morality in the Western tradition are mainly based on the principle of charity. One concept of charity is the love of one's enemies, as Luke reports that Jesus told his audience: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who ill-treat you. If someone strikes you on one cheek, turn to him the other also. If someone takes your cloak, do not stop him from taking your tunic. Give to everyone who asks you, and if anyone takes what belongs to you, do not demand

it back. Do to others as you would have them do to you. If you love those who love you, what credit is that to you? Even 'sinners' love those who love them. And if you do good to those who are good to you, what credit is that to you? Even 'sinners' do that. And if you lend to those from whom you expect repayment, what credit is that to you? Even 'sinners' lend to 'sinners', expecting to be repaid in full. But love your enemies, do good to them, and lend to them without expecting to get anything back. Then your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High, because he is kind to the ungrateful and wicked. Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful" (Luke. 6, 27-35).

No one thinks about hostility on hearing those words of charity; and this is, as we stated, the main implication of morality. But - for instance - if we put Oscar Wilde's comment next to it: "Always forgive your enemies, nothing annoys them so much", we touch that unconscious current of hostility in the love for enemies. (This is one reason why we don't allow people to tell jokes or draw caricatures concerning our religious beliefs: we fear the reminder of the truth that can be transported by jokes and caricatures.) At least those who find Wilde's word funny reveal that they have an idea of the hostile implication. Otherwise they would not have felt like laughing. The Christian prescription of charity offers an undiscovered implication, if people read this with its humorous sense. In Oscar Wilde's sense, charity is bearing a quantity of hostility. It gives destitute people, who have no other means and opportunities, domination and sovereignty at no cost.

Sigmund Freud denied even the possibility of realizing the principle of charity in the gospel of Luke's "love for enemies". Much too tremendous are the costs for the resignation in love for enemies. It imposes duties on me for whose fulfillment I must be ready to make sacrifices. The economical system of our soul, in the psychoanalytical sense, does nothing for free, or to put it more scientifically: it does nothing without cause. Every emotion and every feeling has a corresponding relationship to pleasure. Resignation is not an original cause. It is the reaction to recognizing that there are no other possibilities. To make an individual disclaim an expectation of pleasure, it must have a prospect of happiness or pleasure - which also means diminution of unhappiness.

Freud quotes one of the ideal demands of civilized society, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself", and adds the questions: "Why should we do it? What good will it do us? Above all, how shall we achieve it? How can it be possible?" (Freud 1962, p. 56). One has to deserve my love otherwise love is worthless and occurs by accident. The loved one is selected by choice. If everybody is selected, no one is selected.

On closer inspection of the love for enemies, Freud found further difficulties, especially the problem that an "enemy" will appreciate my kindness to forgive him without cause, which leads Freud to the cognition: "... obedience to high ethical demands entail damage to the aims of civilization, for it puts a positive premium for being bad" (Ibid., p. 58). One can feel beloved by god while one dwells in comfort, as Freud describes with a quotation from the author Heinrich Heine: "Mine is the

most peaceful disposition. My wishes are: a humble cottage with a thatched roof, but a good bed, good food, the freshest milk and butter, flowers before my window, and a few fine trees before my door; and if god wants to make my happiness complete, he will grant me the joy of seeing some six or seven of my enemies hanging from those trees. Before their death I shall, moved in my heart, forgive them all the wrong they did me in their lifetime. One must, it is true, forgive one's enemies – but not before they have been hanged" (Heine, H., *Gedanken und Einfälle*, quoted from ibid. p. 57).

To Freud it is obvious that the permanent threat of civilized societies is an underlying "primary mutual hostility of human beings". Because instincts are stronger than reasonable interests, civilization "has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to men's aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check".

In fact, we have good reason to assume that almost every moral judgment is built on this gain of power. Ethics and morals are the easiest to use of all instruments of power, especially by those who lack any other such instruments.

THE TALKING OF "THE THEY"

In a very different way, Martin Heidegger had the intuition that the identification with the anonymous community arises from a specific fear (angst) about expressing individual emotions, feelings, interests and values. Instead of being oneself and being responsible, members of a community prefer the distance from themselves they achieve among others: "being-with-one-another has the character of distantiality", Heidegger states. He continues: "This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the others' in such a way that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, disappear more and more. In this inconspicuousness and non-ascertainment unfolds its true dictatorship" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 118).

This distantiality creates not only averageness but also a loss of individual responsibility. If one does what the average does; if one feels like "they" feel; and if one claims to have no other interests than "they" have, one has feelings and convictions that are not one's own. As we will see, this is the concept of a categorical imperative, which is the utmost secular principle of ethics and morality in the world of academic philosophy: to express the motive of an action not as the result of an individual desire, but as the common duty. In the course of thinking that he is analyzing the essence of pure practical reason, Kant does none other than describe what individuals do when they do not allow themselves to express their own interests: They hide their own distinguishable and explicit ideas behind the duty of doing what "the They" expects him to do.

Unfortunately, this seems to be the principle of every moral judgment. If we judge morally, we declare something that is in our own interest to be a common duty. Because Kant thinks that morality must consist mainly of a categorical imperative such as: "Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law", Kant describes what an individual always wishes, without

knowing or understanding Kant or being conscious of the wish. But Kant confused cause and consequence. The categorical imperative is not the beginning of an action, it is only a rational reflection on what I have done. What I have done is to have interpreted an individual interest – or angst – as a common duty. And this is what happens in every moral judgment, when I say that it must be a common interest, which I am about to do or to avoid.

Sometimes it really is a common interest. The universal prohibition "Thou shalt not lie" is empirically based on the wisdom that everybody has a tendency to lie if he can gain from lying. However, I never want to be the victim of a lie. This interest of mine as an individual would not impress the one I want to prevent from lying unless I present the appearance that this is a common interest, not my own, and I am only doing my duty to represent the common duty. In case of the prohibition "Thou shalt not lie" there is undoubtedly a common interest. But the assumption that I would do anything else but hide my own interest behind the common duty appears as pure metaphysical speculation. There is no need for this assertion, because we have no idea how to prove it, and the action is totally understandable without metaphysics. The categorical imperative appears to be nothing but a hypothetical imperative. It depends on empirical conditions and interests that are supposed to become invisible behind the strong command.

Kant's ethical theory is a rationalist version of "Strict Father morality, which Kant combines with the Family of Man metaphor and the Society of Mind metaphor" (Lakoff et al.,1999, p. 416).

What Kant and modern Kantians deem the utmost moral principle is on the other hand an example of Heidegger's theory of the fear of being oneself. "It is an existential character of the 'they'. In its being, the 'they' is essentially concerned with averageness. Thus, the 'they' maintains itself factually in the averageness of what is proper, what is allowed, and what is not. Of what is granted success and what is not" (Heidegger, 1999, p. 118).

STRATEGIC ETHICS

One can suspect that Freud, Kant, Heidegger and all the quoted poets above who give examples of the hidden fear (angst) of our repressed pleasure and repressed aggression are of poor scientific power, and that the morally good is nothing else but the morally good. But meanwhile, studies in empirical ethics and "Triune Ethics Theory (TET)" (Narvaez, 2008) have documented astonishing results. They give us a new impression of the hostile implication in moral motivation. Game theory offers a wide variety of experiments to answer the question of how people can be motivated to be fair and just (de Quervain et al., 2004). The simplest game that exhibits altruistic punishment is the Ultimatum Game. The game goes like this:

"Under conditions of anonymity, two player are shown a sum of money, say $10. One of the players, called the Proposer, is instructed to offer any number

of dollars, from $1 to $10, to the second player, who is called the Responder. The Proposer can make only one offer and the Responder can either accept or reject this offer. If the Responder accepts the offer, the money is shared accordingly. If the Responder rejects the offer, both players receive nothing. The two players do not face each other again.

There is only one Responder strategy that is a best response for a self-regarding individual: accept anything you are offered. Knowing this, a self-regarding Proposer who believes he faces a self-regarding Responder, offers the minimum possible amount, $1, and this is accepted.

However, when actually played, the self-regarding outcome is almost never attained or even approximated in fact, as many replications of this experiment have documented, under varying conditions and with varying amounts of money" (Gintis, 2009, p. 57).

The game proves that a common rational choice theory does not describe how real people decide an action. It also proves however that real people are not driven by the Pareto optimum, which would be fulfilled with any amount the Proposer offers. Perhaps the most interesting result of the study of this game is that the Responder is not primarily motivated by moral feelings or moral rationality. The motive to reject unfair offers lies in the emotions of anger, revenge, and the power to punish the Proposer.

Gintis, de Quervain, Fehr, and others have discovered within this game that altruism normally is not pure altruism but is caused by the intention to punish individuals who make unfair offers. Those punishments are not primarily driven by a rational awareness of normative ethics, but are driven by emotions and feelings of aggression like anger, envy, rage or revenge. In these cases the motivation of morality is obviously a primary hostile emotion, not a rational decision in the sense of rational choice theories or theories of the free will. It is even less the result of a categorical imperative. Gintis summarizes these results of empirical ethics: "Recent neuroscientific evidence supports the notion that subjects punish those who are unfair to them simply because this gives them pleasure" (Gintis, 2009, p. 51).

While scanning a subject's brains with positron emission tomography and examining the neural basis for the altruistic punishment of defectors in an economic exchange, the first reaction toward moral judgment occurs in areas that are unconscious. We have no reason to expect that a rational will, acting only according to the maxim that one would wish to become universal law, initiates the action. An unconscious activity in the reward system in the limbic area forces the individual to act in a way that could be interpreted afterwards as if a categorical imperative had existed. But the empirical result shows that even the categorical imperative is based on the existence of a primary impulse in the limbic system. Consequently the categorical imperative is actually a hypothetical one, which means

that the ideal demand of pure reason appears as nonsense. Every ethical judgment is dependent on a non-ethical supposition, which is best described in terms of the biology of the brain and the strategies of game theory. We can postulate a fear (angst) however in ethical theory to accommodate the empirical supposition in ideal demands.

The empirical conditions, at least in the case of the Ultimatum game, are summarized by Gintis too:

"Punishment activated the dorsal striatum, which has been implicated in the promising of rewards that occurs as a result of goal-directed actions. Moreover, subjects with stronger activations in the dorsal striatum were willing to incur greater costs in order to punish. This finding supports the hypothesis that people derive satisfaction from punishing norm violations and that the activation in the dorsal striatum rejects the anticipated satisfaction from punishing defectors.

Third, it may be that subjects really do not believe that conditions of anonymity will be respected, and they behave altruistically because they fear their selfish behaviour will be revealed to others.

Fourth, and perhaps most telling, in tightly controlled experiments designer to test the hypothesis that subject-experimenter anonymity is important in fostering altruistic behaviour, it is found that subjects behave similarly regardless of the experimenter's knowledge of their behavior" (Gintis, 2009, p. 51).

THE FEAR OF LOSING ALL MORALITY

Our consciousness does not necessarily reflect what really happens in those areas of our brain that are unable to lie. Instead of reflecting the true beliefs and convictions of a character, our mind seems to fear those sensations and rejects them. In philosophical literature on ethics at least, there is even a powerful tendency to fear all of the work in the neurosciences demonstrating that the reflections of our consciousness do not have the meaning that self-confidence attributes to them. "Not my brain thinks, I am thinking", authors are shouting out, as if powerful dictums could save our sense that the conscious self primarily rules our moral actions. In analogy to the quotation: "If God does not exist, everything is allowed", they think: "If our conscious self does not exist in the way it is reflected in self-confidence, everything is allowed."

By explaining every categorical imperative in terms of hypothetical imperatives, the strategic considerations of game theory gain importance in founding even ethic rationality. If we follow the hypothesis that every ethical problem is to be described as the problem of transforming a zero-sum game in a non-zero-sum game (cooperative game), we no longer need to deny the interest in power and the elements if ethical hostility within most every moral judgment. Further studies

should therefore investigate whether this hypothesis can be proved. The hypothesis goes back to considerations in Thomas Schelling's *Strategy of Conflict*: "If the zero-sum game is the limiting case of pure conflict, what is the other extreme? It must be the 'pure-collaboration' game in which the players win or lose together, having identical preferences regarding the outcome" (Schelling, 1980, p. 84f). The Freudian idea of ambivalence of emotions and feelings returns in a new sense in strategic game theory, as Schelling says: "If we accept the idea of two selves of which usually one is in charge at a time, or two value systems that are alternate rather than subject to simultaneous and integrated scrutiny, 'rational decision' has to be replaced with something like collective choice. Two or more selves that alternatively occupy the same individual that have different goals and tastes, ... have to be construed as engaged not in joint optimization but in a strategy game"(Schelling, 1982, p. 93f).

There is no need to fear the loss of ethics and morality if we step away from ethics construed by the imagined pure reason or the pure and absolute good. Strategic thinking and the need to cooperate, the natural tendency to establish fairness, and many economical and social reasons will always give us empirical reasons to establish normative principles and ethical systems. But strategic ethics will avoid the dishonesty of hiding hostile implications behind the masks of unrighteous philanthropy.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I showed that ethics is not only a matter of the good. One of its major tasks is the transformation of concealed hostility into moral feelings. Motivation of this transformation seems to be mainly the fear (angst) of an individual's own hostility. As long as standard ethics only concentrate on traditional concepts of the goodness, they cannot give answers to questions of how hostile emotions are going into moral sentiments and ethical systems and how we could avoid this.

Writers, biologists, psychologists and economists supply a wide range of examples which made clear that some kind of ethical hostility is well known. First of all, I have drawn attention to the naming of the word "justice" that is able to conceal the emotion of revenge. In order to understand the mechanism how the feeling of being good can make hostile motivations vanish I quoted the prayer for the Jews. This non-fictional and well known example describes clearly the action of charity (praying) as an act of hostility. The decisive factor in this example is the fact that a person who prays is not at all aware of his hostile emotions against the Jews. On the contrary, he may have the feeling of doing something for the Jews - namely to plead for redeeming them. It seems obvious that the more ardent the action of praying is carried out, the better it conceals the remembrance of hostile emotions of a praying individual. While Catholics estimate praying to be something good, it seems to be necessary to conceal and transform hostility.

Biologists have discovered that any human action can only be effective if the reward-system in the brain is activated. Therefore the investigation of moral actions must not generate the opinion that they could be done without a reward. Even altruism rewards an individual with good emotions, and the altruistic action would not be done without the expectation of this reward. Meanwhile economists and psychologists investigate the nature of fairness and altruism. They appear as forms of hostility (punishment) transformed into the feeling of good. Another element of hostility in ethical and moral behaviour is the interest in gaining power. Above all the aim of ethics is to provide those with additional chances who have fewer chances by birth or because of their social participation. Humor can be a clue to concealed angst of hostility in moral talking. Ethical theory as well as moral feelings conceal the instrument of power and declare ethics only to be interested in the good and not at all an instrument of power.

We called it moral fear, a special amount of fear or, better, angst, which motivates individuals to hide their hostile interests or emotions behind moral language and moral action. In the same way as fear – in the sense of angst – motivates individuals to do things that are able to diminish the angst but not to diminish dangers, moral fear arises from the individual's memory of what he has learned to be good or bad. We referred to Sigmund Freud's theory of motivating power of taboos. Therefore, moral fears have a close connection to neuroses. Like neuroses, they are not related to real existing danger but to the consciousness of an individual. Dropping names or avoiding names, as sometimes observed, in demands of political correctness, are not to be aimed at reducing discriminating factors but of avoid naming them precisely.

Looking at ethics in a strategic way, we understand much better the motivation of ethical values in modern society. Ethics is not the opposite of strategic thinking; it is one aspect of it. Strategic ethics does not deny the interests of individuals and opens the way to describe strategies to increase cooperation. If ethics is understood as the strategy to transform zero-sum games in non-zero-sum games, we have a major task for ethics: to describe the motivation for cooperation in cases one could consider might derive greater benefit by not cooperating. In strategic ethics, there is no need to produce fear of one's own desires or interests.

NOTES

[1] Nida-Rümelin, J. (1995). Vorwort: „Vernünftigerweise tut man das, was die besten Folgen hat. Diese scheinbar trivial richtige These ist falsch. Warum sie falsch ist, wird in diesem Buch zu zeigen versucht." (Translation by the author.)

[2] Habermas, J. (1991) p. 0 writes in the Vorwort "...den Vorrang des deontologisch verstandenen Gerechten vor dem Guten zu verteidigen." (Translation by the author.)

[3] Theologists who have detailed information about the Pope's state of mind, tell us, that the Prayer for the Jews is not only anti-Judaic, but even anti-Semitic. (Berger, D., 2010, p. 97.)

[4] http://www.newser.com/story/18484/jews-outraged-at-vatican-prayer.html.

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